Recent times saw the publication of a good number of articles and book chapters about promises and related normative phenomena like contracts, agreements, voluntary undertakings and consent. Of these one may think that promises are the least important, and if we think of the kind of promises that moral and political philosophers write about this may be so. At least it is true that most undertakings and agreements are much less formally created, arising not so much out of explicit acts of commitment as out of the implied meaning and consequences of an interaction over time. Discussions of promises commonly aim to illuminate much more than promises. They aim to explain voluntary undertakings in general, and to shed light on consent, hypothetical consent and agreements. That promises are undertaken (or are at least discussed by philosophers as if they are undertaken) in an act of commitment merely makes them clearer and easier to discuss, but mutatis mutandis they stand for the wider class.
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But do they? Possibly the paradigm, and therefore the explanation, is radically different.
It may be in the web of mutual obligations arising out of stable continuous interactions, of one or another of recognised kinds, among people, as in personal friendship, or in parent-child relations, or the relation between a client and his regular supplier of goods or services.
I will not discuss the claims of this second type of explanation. It seems to be credible, and of great importance to the understanding of social life. I doubt, though, that it can displace the accounts of promises and other undertakings generated by acts of commitment. They require a different explanation, and their explanation is also vital to an understanding of human interactions. The explanation of promises alone is the topic of this paper. 1 reasons account. Sections Three and Four will raise difficulties with that account leading to its abandonment in favour of an alternative in Sections Five and Six. Throughout I will avoid technicalities except when they matter to the issues under consideration. Thus I will refer indistinguishably to the promise, the promising, or the promising act as the reason or the source of the reason, or something that creates or establishes or provides a reason. I will not consider the conditions for a promise to be valid (can young children bind themselves by promising? Are promises to act immorally binding?
Are promises binding after the death of the promissee, etc.), and will assume that they are fulfilled in the cases here discussed. And for the most part I will not comment about the special character of obligations, even though promisors have an obligation to keep the promise, and assume no more than that they are reasons. Nor will I say much about the fact that promissees have a right that the promise be kept. 
Promissory reasons as content--independent reasons
To see the difficulty think of an ordinary case: I have reason not to hit you, in fact there are a number of such reasons: it may injure you, it may cause you pain, invade your body, etc. They all depend on the nature of the action, its consequences and context. Though to avoid misunderstanding it is worth remarking that on my view the right to have a particular promise kept is derivative from the general right to have promises made to one kept, and it is grounded on the general interest promissees have to have the promise-generated relation to promisors. whatever the action I promise to perform (or to refrain from) the reason is the same: my promise. Of course, these are different promises. But normatively speaking they are the same, they are all binding on me because they are promises I made, regardless of what is the act promised. This is why they are (called) content-independent reasons. 4 There are considerations that make them binding, that account for the fact that the promisor has a duty to perform the promised act. But these are reasons why a promise is binding as a promise. They have nothing to do with its specific content.
This last paragraph exaggerates. Some acts or omissions cannot be promised. One can mean to and even try to promise them, by communicating an intention that would have made a valid promise had it related to acts or omissions that can be promised, but the putative promise will not be binding. 5 If so, in what sense are promises contentindependent reasons?
One simple idea is that promises are binding qua promises (or rather that that is the only ground for their binding character of relevance here), and that they are promises because they are communications of an intention to undertake an obligation by that very communication, regardless of their content, regardless of which act or omission they are about. I suggested that there are exceptions; acts that one cannot promise to perform. For example, a promise (given in current circumstances) to exterminate homo sapiens or all primate species would not be binding. One may think that so long as such exceptions are rare they do not undermine the suggestion that promises are contentindependent. Such classifications are commonly subject to exceptions. For example, As these discussions illustrate there are other kinds of content-independent reasons. E.g., whenever any person or institution has (normative) power to impose duties on some people those duties are content-independent for they are binding not because of their content but because they are the product of the use of duty-imposing powers.
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'promise' and its cognates are used to refer both to what I here called a putative promise, and to a binding promise. As is common I rely on context to disambiguate their meaning.
most of his readers do not think that Nozick's idea of side-constraints is undermined by the fact that, as he allows, side-constraints are not exceptionless. 6 We have, however, to say more in order to explain the kind of reasons we are talking about. We require an explanation on two grounds: (1) if the exceptions are not to undermine the cogency of the classification, there must an explanation of what it is that makes them exceptional. Perhaps there is no need for a special explanation when the suspected exceptions are borderline cases. But many, including my examples, are not.
(2) The acts for which we have content-independent reasons are acts for which we have such reasons because of some of their features: they bring the acts within the ambit of those reasons. So in classifying the reasons as content-independent we mean that some aspects of (the content) of the acts are irrelevant to the fact that they fall within the ambit of those reasons. But that is true of all acts: reasons apply to them because of some, not all of their features. We need an explanation of the special way in which these reasons are content-independent.
We can proceed on the assumption that all content-independent reasons are generated by the use of normative powers. This is not entirely true but the explanation of why the other cases are cases of content-independent reasons is analogous to explanations that apply to reasons generated by the use of normative powers.
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Normative powers are the abilities of people (or institutions) to change normative situations or conditions (i.e. to impose or repeal duties, to confer or revoke rights, to change status etc.) by acts intended to achieve these changes, where the ability depends on (namely is based on, grounded on, justified by) the desirability (the value) of those people (or institutions) having them.
In the case of promises the value of the power is that it expands people's ability to fashion their lives, or aspects of their lives, by their actions. Through their promises they 6
See Anarchy State and Utopia p.
A typical and relatively well-known example concerns the making of the first laws of a new legal system, e.g. of its first constitution. In all respects it is just like the use of legislative power, except that as the original lawmakers established the first laws of the system there was at the time no law that conferred legislative power on them. They may or may not have had mere moral power, but they did not have morally valid legal power to make the laws that they did. I discussed such cases in commit themselves to others. Up to a point, promises are analogous to decisions that constitute reasons for the deciders to perform the act they decided to perform. Both are ways of opening up options through closing other options, normatively speaking.
Decisions, as well as having goals, facilitate undertaking complex activities (giving a ball, writing a symphony, etc.) that require concerted actions. Promises, being commitments to others, facilitate co-operation, the forging of relations that presuppose dependence, trust and joint actions, and more. For the sake of brevity I will refer to the value of having these powers as the value of enhanced control (of one's life) 8 , though a somewhat different explanation of their value is required when the powers are held by institutions.
Now we have the answers to our questions: The claim that some (putative) promises
are not binding presupposes a distinction between binding promises that are overridden by conflicting reasons, and promises that are not binding, and therefore do not constitute any reason at all. The difference is that the former do, and the latter do not serve the value that grounds the power to promise, giving promises their normative force, making them reasons for the promised acts. The assumption is that there are some undertakings ability to make which does not serve the value of having enhanced control. Ability to promise to become a slave may be an example, as is a promise to destroy all primates. If the assumption is mistaken, and that is a substantive moral 8
Note that no claim is made that trust or co-operation etc. require promises. They do not, but often the ability to promise makes it easier to facilitate them, as well as -by refraining from promising -to make clear that they are not sought. However (these observations are prompted by a question of Selim Berker), would not the value of enhanced control be equally served if people believed that they have the power to promise even though they do not have it? False beliefs always lead to the conduct that the same beliefs would have led to had they been true until they collide with reality, a collision that if circumstances are propitious, leads to their abandonment. The same is true of normative beliefs. Those who know that they do not have the power to promise will not be able to make promises (unless they are willing to mislead the promissees) and those who discover that there is no power to make binding promises will realize that all the promises made to them are not binding, and the trust and reliance they inspired are ill-founded, or depend on the promissees remaining ignorant of the truth. Not only the vulnerability of the falsely secured enhanced control leads to it not being as valuable as the one provided by the power to promise. It is also misguided to think that a significant good is systematically secured by continued false belief, especially when this implies, as it does here, that people unknowingly rely on the other not knowing the truth. The considerations help with the question what intention is required for the promise to be valid. Clearly, an intention to keep the promise is not a condition of its validity. But is an intention to undertake an obligation by the act of communication such a condition? Is an intention to communicate an intention to undertake an obligation? Some would argue that the value of having the power to promise is served only so long as one is bound only when the promising is done with the intention to thereby undertake an obligation. But arguably an intention to communicate, by the conduct that constitutes promising, an intention to undertake an obligation is sufficient for the promise to be binding, according the explanation I gave. Others say that neither intention is needed for a promise to be binding. Promises are binding if the promissee would reasonably assume that the intention to undertake (or to communicate an intention to undertake) is present. This, if unqualified, goes too far. The consequences of even reasonable mistakes may justly have to be borne by those who make them. However, when a reasonable mistake is due to careless or negligent conduct of the promisor, the promisor will have a duty to compensate for any untoward consequences of the mistake, and that would often be the same as a duty to keep the promise (or to compensate for its breach). It would be pedantic to expect our concepts to be clear about whether that duty is the promissory duty or a separate one.
obligation that the promise would have generated had it been binding, is overridden.
What explains the absence of the power to make such a (binding) promise is that it is not desirable that one should be able to decide whether or not to undertake such a commitment.
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That is why the value of the ability to bind oneself to others, in identifying the range of acts performance of which we have the power to promise, establishes the sense in which the reasons to perform them are content-independent: it is not independent of their character as promised acts (whose performance was undertaken in binding promises), but it is independent of all their other features. The fact that they depend only on this one external property makes the use of the term content-independence natural.
Promissory reasons as bare reasons
Does this explanation of why promises constitute content-independent reasons answer the question of the title? It appears to do so: we have reason to act as we promised because we promised, and promises are such reasons because they are the product of the use of a valuable normative power. This may be true, but it also generates a puzzle.
Given that normatively all promises have the force of a promise, it must be, the argument goes, that their strength or stringency is the same. It does not matter whether the promise was to look after your children while you are away on a work-trip next week, or to lend you a copy of the new Murakami novel. The reason to keep either of these promises is the same because they are both promises, and have the so-called weight that all promises have. This may appear absurd. But perhaps it is not. Arguably as promises they all have the same force or weight. But once given they may affect the course of events in different ways. In the children promise my friend forgoes making alternative arrangements for looking after his children in his absence, in the Murakami case he forgoes buying the novel in a book sale. Given these facts the results of breaking 10 How broad is the category of cases regarding which it is not desirable that one should have the power to bind oneself? It may relate to types of acts (self-enslavement, etc.) or duration or other aspects of the promise (cannot promise to obey forever, etc.), and it applies to the largest class of cases that does not include a subclass (demarcated in universal terms) such that it is desirable to have the power to promise regarding it. the promises will be very different, and therefore the force of the promise is different, much greater in the children promise than in the Murakami one. But the difference in the strength of the reasons for keeping the promises is due not to the bare facts that I made the promises, but to events that happened as a result of promising, and for which I am responsible. Qua promises my reasons to do as I promised are indeed the same, the appearance of the difference is due to other events for which I am responsible. Of course, one may point out that the additional reasons, the ones that depend on the consequences and/or context of the promise, would not constitute the reasons that they are but for the promise. Therefore, they are promise-generated reasons. promise has greater strength. 12 As each promise defeats "ordinary" self-regarding reasons against keeping it, the more it costs me the stronger it is: the more weighty reasons against keeping it it defeats. So by making that promise I determine its strength at least to that extent. If promises are ever binding that is because of the value of people having the power to determine (up to a point) the strength of the promised act relative to their other interests. But that does not mean that there is value in people being able to determine the strength of the reasons that promises generate, or the strength of any other reasons, relative to the strength of reasons that arise out of the interests of others. There is not. I cannot make a binding promise to come to your party even if this will require me to injure or rob someone, or not to help a person just injured in an accident, etc. While it is, I assume, desirable that I should have some control over the strength of my promise relative to some of my own other interests, and the very making of a promise does just that, there is no case for letting me determine its strength relative to other people's needs, interests, etc.
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The strength of a reason is its standing when conflicting with other reasons.
Assume that G has a general power to determine the strength of his promises. He can I have argued that promises have exclusionary force: They are reasons not to act for some reasons that apply to the promisor. More specifically, they are reasons not to act on some reasons that arise out of the promisor's convenience or his personal interests. That is why the reasons they provide are duties (roughly, exclusionary categorical reasons). This is consistent with the fact that the duty to act as promised can be overridden by some considerations relating to the promisor's interests or well-being.
As always there are exceptions that confirm the underlying principle. So, what determines the bare strength of the promissory reason? As with all other practical reasons, it must depend on the considerations that make promises binding. At this point the content-independent character of our case complicates matters: The case for any particular promise being binding, thereby being a reason for the promised act, does not depend on the specific character of the action promised, but merely on the 16 We need not consider here whether a no-conflict situation is in principle possible.
fact that it was promised. Therefore, it would appear that the case for keeping a promise must rest with factors that unite all binding promises regardless of their content. So, plausibly the factors that determine the strength of the reason to promise are to be found in the case for, the value of, possessing the power to promise. For example, given that I promised to let you use my car today, I have reason to let you use my car today. That reason does not depend on the wisdom or value of having made the promise, nor of your using the car, of having the chance to use it, nor of that chance being provided by me, nor on anything else to do with this particular promise and its content. It derives from the power to promise. Needless to say, I would not have the power if my promises did not bind me. They bind me because I have the power to bind myself, and I used it to make them.
Why not the other way round? Why not say that I have the power because my promises are binding? The order is the order of grounding or justification: as was suggested in the previous section, we have the power to promise because it is valuable to be able to undertake obligations, of certain kinds and in certain conditions, and that value is sufficient to establish in us the normative power to do so. Powers, normative and otherwise, are not valuable unless some of their uses are. But their value is not in the value of their uses. It is in the value of the option to use them. Refraining from using them is one of the options that possession of powers provides, and indeed not using a power can be to the advantage of those who have it as much as using it. As was mentioned in the previous section, they can earn money or other benefits by making it known (or by undertaking) that they will not use a power.
Here finally is the puzzle: I have a reason to let my friend use my car because I promised, and the promise is binding because that is the consequence of having and using the power to promise, and I have the power because of the value of the enhanced ability to shape my life that it provides. The value of that power should, I suggested, determine the force of the reason to keep the promise. But it does not seem to do so.
My enhanced ability to control my life manifests itself in having the power to promise and in using it by promising. How does it reflect on the reason to keep a promise, and on its strength? Keeping the promise will not further enhance that ability, nor will breaking the promise undermine it. The normative case is a case for possessing the power to promise, not a case for keeping a promise, unless that is constitutive of or conducive to having the power. But is it? People who break their promises do nevertheless have the power to promise, as is evidenced by the fact that their promises are binding. If they were not there would be nothing wrong in breaking them.
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It is true that sometimes breaking promises will reduce the value of having the power to promise. Generally speaking the value of the power depends on the degree to which some people (those to whom we may wish to make promises) trust us to keep our promises. Sometimes, though far from always, breaking a promise undermines that trust.
In such circumstances the case for protecting the value of the power to promise is one of the secondary strength-affecting considerations I referred to above. But in no case does it affect the strength of the bare reason to keep a promise, because it does not affect possession of the power to promise and the case for the power is the only resource that can provide bare promissory reasons for keeping promises.
It would, by this reasoning, appear that the value of having the power to promise is realised, and exhausts itself, by making binding promises. It does not determine the strength of the reason to keep one's promise. Worse still, it appears not to determine the strength of promissory reasons because it is powerless to give one a reason to keep promises.
Is there a bare reason to keep promises?
I began with a puzzle about the resources available to determine the strength of the bare reason to keep a promise. In exploring it we discover that it goes further. It raises a question mark on the very existence of a reason to keep a promise. Earlier I assumed that the value of enhanced control over one's life, by providing an adequate case for 17 Some people think that habitual promise-breakers lose the normative power to promise. I think that they lose trust of others, and with it much of the value of having the power to promise, but they lose that power only if it is impossible for them to regain trust, and only if having the trust of others is the only way in which the power to promise is valuable to those who have it. Both conditions rarely materialize. It is true, though, that if a promise breaker loses the confidence of people they will refuse to accept, or will rescind, any promise he may make.
having the power to promise, also constitutes an adequate case for the binding force of Second premise: A reason that has no strength-determining factors is no reason at all.
First, an aside: Could it be that it has some strength that we simply cannot know? Even if it has, the point is irrelevant here. The premise is about factors that make the strength what it is, regardless of our ability to know the strength. But throughout the discussion I assume that factors that ground reasons can in principle be known because reasons are factors that one can be guided by, one can act for, and that requires that they will bein principle -knowable. 19 I further assume that they can not only be known, but be understood. They are intelligible considerations, ones whose force and binding character can be understood.
Given that assumption, then if a reason has strength or stringency there are grounds determining its stringency that can be known. And if there are none then either there is no reason or there is a reason whose degree of strength or stringency is zero. That possibility can be ruled out, given that the very idea of a reason is of a factor that militates in favour of some action (or omission), namely that lends some support to the possible conclusion that that action is the one to take.
But perhaps we should distinguish between two aspects of the normative force of reasons: the first is that they favour an action (or omission), the second that they have some strength or force. The first aspect is essential to all practical reasons, but the second is not. In its absence the reason cannot defeat any conflicting reasons, but it can I suggested above that that is hardly ever the case with actions. But perhaps it is not that rare with omissions.
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Note that the claim that any reason has some strength supporting the conclusion that the action it is a reason for is to be done is consistent with allowing that its existence makes no difference to the conclusion that the action is the one to be undertaken. This argument does not contradict any of the premises of the earlier argument that seemed to establish that there are binding promises. Rather, it points to a missing step:
that argument relied on the fact that it would be good if people had the power to promise, and that there is no conflicting normative case sufficient to show that on balance people should not have that power. But that is not enough to show that people have the power to promise. It is impossible to have the power to promise, however good it may be to have it, unless that one promised is a reason to do as one promised, and it is impossible for there to be a reason to keep a promise unless it has strength. If promissory reasons have no strength they do not exist and however desirable it is to have the power to promise one cannot have it.
Yet we do have it. It would seem that I have failed to notice some factor that connects the case for the power to promise with the reasons to keep promises in each case in which one has promised. The fault may be in looking for too direct a connection. Here is one different approach, based on considerations of integrity: the power to promise serves and expresses one's ability to have some control over one's normative situation.
Having exercised that power by making a promise it would show lack of integrity to deny that one is bound by the promise. Possibly, the degree to which denying that a promise is binding compromises one's integrity varies with the content of the promise, and therefore while the reason is always the promise its strength varies with the damage to one's integrity of denying that it is binding.
reason for doing Φ is present so is another reason for Φ-ing, and that the combined strength of both is no greater than the strength of either one of them in support of the action.
But the argument is suspect for it merely shows that the promisor has reason not to deny that his promises are binding. Is that enough to show that they are binding (even assuming that the reasons not to deny that they are are conclusive)? Besides, the argument is guilty of petitio principii. Integrity is involved only regarding people's attitudes to obligations they have. It cannot establish the existence of those obligations, and therefore it cannot establish that promises create reasons.
The conclusion towards which we are driven is that there are no bare promissory reasons, and therefore no considerations that determine their strength. The thought that there are misunderstands promises because it misunderstands the point of promises. This conclusion can be reinforced by examples.
Consider the car lending case with some additions. Abby promised to bring Ben her car and leave it in his garage for his own use for the whole of today. Yesterday Ben, who lives alone, was taken suddenly ill and is now in hospital unconscious, where he is expected to stay for at least a week. The example is meant to be one of a bare promise in that no conditions that could qualify as secondary strength-affecting considerations obtain. 22 Would Abby be breaking her promise if she fails to leave the car in Ben's garage, and instead uses it to do her shopping? Could it be that she would be breaking the promise and violating her duty to Ben, but that she is justified in doing so because the reasons to use the car for her shopping defeat the reasons for keeping the promise?
It is hard to think of any reasons that would not defeat the promising reason. Suppose it is just to save her the expense on petrol of driving the car to Ben's place, or suppose it is just saving herself the bother of getting out of bed in time to deliver the car. It appears that any reason against keeping the promise would in the circumstances override the promising reason. That makes it virtually impossible to maintain that the promise is a reason to perform the promised act. As we saw, to be a reason the promise must have some strength or force, and strength just is resistance to conflicting reasons. A reason that is defeated by any possible conflicting reason is (possibly apart from some exceptional cases) one without force and therefore is not a reason. That
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That means that it is assumed that Ben intended to use the car himself, made no arrangements for others to use it if he is prevented from doing so, that there is no one with the right to make such arrangements in his stead, etc.
conclusion generalises to all promises. The reason we are investigating is the reason provided by a bare promise according to the account that takes the strength of that reason to be the same regardless of the content of the promise. It is determined just by the fact that it is a promise, and is the strength of all bare promissory reasons (promises to counteract climate change, to provide pensions for the elderly, etc.). It appears that the bare reason account must be mistaken.
The way out is to deny that in the circumstances Abby is bound by the promise.
Promises, like intentions, decisions, orders, vows, permissions, and the like are subject to conditions. These can be described as part of the content of the promise (I will give you the car so long as there is the slightest chance that having it will be of use to you, or something along those lines) or they can be described as part of the ground rules that limit the kind of promises people can make: the limits can be conditions under which promises lapse, etc. (rather than merely specifying kinds of promises that can never be binding). In some cases one of those ways of perceiving the situation is better than the other. In some cases it matters not which way it is taken to be. What matters is that in some kinds of circumstances, and Abby's are one such kind, promises that appear to apply to them do not in fact apply.
This seems right, but it is also right that these background conditions eliminate the possibility of bare promissory reasons. It is plausible to think that in all situations to which no strength-affecting considerations apply there is no valid promissory reason.
That casts doubt on the bare reasons account. It is time to consider an alternative account.
The point of promises and the interests of promissees
We have some building blocks: The point of the power to promise is to expand people's options by enabling them to undertake obligations at will, more specifically by communicating to the promissees an intention to undertake those obligations by that very act of communication. It is a valuable power, which is used (or not used) for many purposes. The value of having the power, and the fact that that value defeats contrary considerations, constitute the case for the existence of the power. It shows that its existence is desirable.
The difficulty we encountered is that it is impossible to have the power unless promising creates a reason to perform the promised act. And so far we found no way in which the value of having the power by itself generates such a reason. We need an account that shows how the exercise of the power changes the normative situation, most likely in different ways on different occasions, and how through that the value of the power to promise can explain why one has a reason to keep promises, the same reason, but possibly with a different strength on each occasion.
To find it we have to describe more fully what we do when we promise. One way to think of it is to think of the point, or purpose, of promises generally, meaning here not the point of having the power to promise (discussed earlier) but the point served by There are marginal cases, but probably not clear counter examples. I can promise my friend to diet if he sets me a weekly eating menu. Clearly that is a promise meant to help me rather than him. But it presupposes that he cares about my state of health, or just about me, and would be gratified if I keep my promise.
discretion. These features are not necessary elements of all undertakings. Vows do not require a recipient in the same way (though some have recipients). Undertaking an office, say of a judge, is not open to revocation at will by some recipients, etc. But the two are defining features of promises. Some writers add a third pointer in the same direction: the promissee, they say, has to accept the promise for it to be binding. This may be an exaggeration. I may promise someone in person, face to face, to come and visit him in hospital tomorrow. He receives the promise stone faced, saying nothing and moving not a muscle. My promise is binding, and it requires some imagination to claim that it has been accepted. It is merely that the promissee can release me from the obligation, at any time, including when it is undertaken. He did not do so, which is why I am bound by it.
That the promissee has a right that the promissory duty be kept, and a power to waive it and terminate the duty, reinforces the thought that the obligations are meant to be for the promissees. However, as we saw, being for the promissees does not mean conferring on them an advantage. It has to be understood more broadly, perhaps something like responding to something they are interested in or have an interest in, or may become interested in or develop an interest in (by relying on the promised act, betting on it, or some other way) once the promise is made.
The combination of the two factors, (a) the obligation is for the promissee and (b) he has the power to rescind it, implies a third (c) that the promisor relinquishes control over the question of whether it ever was or still is or is likely to become of interest to or in the interest of the promissee. It is up to the promissee to judge that and cancel it or not cancel it. Promising, we may say, relates to the self-governing ability of the promisor and the promissee alike, though in different ways. The promisor's interest in enhanced ability to control his life establishes his power to promise, and promising is an exercise of the power. On the other side, the promise once made enhances the power of the promissee by giving him the normative assurance of the promised act. I will use this expression to refer to the assurance, which can be overridden and is therefore not advantage of the promisor. But what these are may be very context-dependent. Even a simple extension of the deadline for performance of the promised act will sometimes be against the interest of the promisor.
absolute, that a promise gives the promissee. It is normative for it is provided by the normative structure of a promise. It consists of (a) the obligation the promisor undertakes plus (b) the power of the promissee to terminate that obligation, plus, (c) the disability just noted above of the promisor to terminate the promissory obligation on the ground that it is no longer in the interest of the promissee, and I will return to this point.
We can highlight the role of the promissee by contrasting a promissory obligation to my brother, with an obligation to do something for him arising in some other way. Suppose that my mother told me, and that I should obey her in this matter, to do something for my brother, who is finishing a gruelling task at work. I intend to buy him a week in an Alpine hotel, judging that to be an appropriate gift. Until I actually buy the holiday (and possibly even for some time after that) I should change my intention the moment I realise that it never was, or no longer is, a suitable gift. But if I promised my brother the holiday (thinking that it is an ideal gift) I cannot change my mind. He has the normative assurance that he will have the holiday, and it is now up to him to decide whether to release me from the promise or not.
The general point of promising, I conclude, is to give promissees the normative assurance of the promised act. If that is for the promissees it must relate to their interests (in both senses of the word) that promises serve. The power to promise serves the interest of promisors in enhanced control. When wisely used, and subject to luck, etc., both making a promise and refraining from making one serve an interest of the promisor (or the one who might have been the promisor). Given that promises are for the promissees promisors are served by serving the promissees. They may do so in one or both of two ways. First, the promise or the keeping of the promise may serve, directly or indirectly, an interest of the promissee, or something the promissee is interested in, cares about. Second, the promise gives the promissee (as it were as a gift)
an opportunity to develop an interest, one that it may not be sensible to develop or to have without the promise or the performance of the promised act being there.
I dwell on the second way of being for the promissee not only because it is sometimes ignored, but also because while it is contingent whether the promissee has an interest in the promised act, and whether it serves his interests, it is in the nature of promises that they (to use metaphorical language) extend an invitation (not always trustworthy) to the promissees to develop an interest that depends on the promised act. A book I will lend you may lead to developing new interests, as may a game of chess or an hour on the tennis court, or the loan of a sum of money, and so on. To the extent that a promise provides an opportunity, the opportunity will be there unless the promise is not kept.
Often they can be used after the promises are kept. These opportunities may range from being of little value to being of very great value. The crucial point is that normally opportunities, options, for things or actions that may be of interest to a person have some value in themselves, that is qua opportunities, regardless of whether they are made use of or not. And it is that option that the normative assurance that the promise gives assures. It may do more, much more, but the rest is both specific to individual promises and contingent. If we are looking to what interest the normative assurance the promise is just about always serves -that is it.
Admittedly, even that option may be without value to the promissee. However, promises do not expire once they no longer serve the promissees. As I noted above, giving promissees the power to terminate the promissory reason implies that the continued normative force of the promise depends on the promissee's action -it is not merely that a promise may have lapsed but the promisor may not rely on his judgement on the matter. It does not lapse merely for the reason that it no longer serves the promissee, and the promisor is unable to terminate it on that ground. Its continued existence is now in the promissee's hand. It binds so long as it was not rescinded, provided that the power of the promissee to waive it has not lapsed as well.
The promissee's power is neither unconditional nor absolute. For one thing, the reason to keep the promise may be overridden by conflicting considerations. Furthermore, if the promissee is disabled in a way that makes it impossible for him to waive the promise then if the promise no longer serves the promissee it lapses. That was the case with Abby's promise to lend Ben her car. Once he became ill in such a way that he could neither make use of the car, nor waive the promise to lend him the car, the promise lapsed and Abby had no promissory reason any more to lend him her car. 25 Finally, it is arguable that the power to rescind lapses if abused, that is if exercised for immoral purposes, or in an arbitrary way.
Is the power to rescind the promissory obligation a third kind of promissee's interest (in addition to the interest served by the performance of the promised act and the opportunities to develop new interests that it provides)? David Owens goes further.
Seeking an explanation of the way promises are for the promissees, he claims that their function is to enhance an important individual interest: the interest of gaining authority over another.
[P]romising exists because it serves our authority interest, our interest in having the right to oblige others to do certain things. My claim will be that human beings have an interest in the possession of authority for its own sake, regardless of any further purpose this authority might serve, and that this fact accounts for the distinctive features of a promise.
The authority interest is a normative interest: it is an interest in the possession of a certain right, the right to impose an obligation. 26
I doubt that there is such an interest, and if I am mistaken and people have that interest I doubt that there is a general reason to protect or serve it. But that is beside the point, as its existence is irrelevant to promises. Owens maintains that the fundamental promissory interest is an interest of the promissee … namely the promissee's interest in gaining authority over the promisor.
This suggests that the function of promises is to endow promissees with that authority.
While not all promises are made in order to serve their function, given that they are made intentionally by people who know what promises are, it seems to follow from Owens's view that standardly promises are made when people intend to endow others with authority over them and they make them in order to endow those others with power over them, in order to submit themselves to such power. This is of course consistent with maintaining that promisors make promises in order to serve a goal that 25 Two clarificatory points: First, that Ben's condition is not permanent does not matter. What matters is his ability to waive the promissory duty before or at the time its performance is due. Second, nor does it matter that Ben has an interest in being able to control the duty in the sense that it would have been good for him be able to waive it. The control or power to waive that we are concerned with is the power you have only if you (physically) can use it.
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D. Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, 146 they themselves are interested in. They aim to serve it by making the promise, namely by subjecting themselves to the power of another.
According to the account offered here matters are very different. The point of promises is to provide promissees with normative assurance that the promised act will be performed, thus enabling them to get the advantages and opportunities that that assurance can provide. Again, promises are not always made to serve the point, but standardly this is the intention with which promisors make them: to provide that normative assurance and enable the promissees to have those advantages and opportunities. The power to rescind is merely part of the normative structure that creates the normative assurance: promissees have a right that the promise be kept, and (as with many rights) a power to waive it, to terminate the promissory obligation.
Furthermore, the promise can neither be cancelled by the promisor when it no longer serves the promissee, nor does it then lapse. The normative assurance would have been less secure if the promisor were free to conclude that in the circumstances the promise serves no point and is not (or no longer) binding.
In some cases one can imagine that one's interest in having power over another is not purpose-specific. A hostage taker need not have an idea how to use his power over the hostage before capturing him. Once he has that power he may make the hostage clean his house or aim to secure some political objective by holding him, or releasing him, or just get ransom to release him, etc. With promises this is an implausible account. The power the promissee has is merely to rescind an obligation whose content and creation
were not up to him. His interest in it is almost entirely derivative from his interest in the normative assurance of the promised act, and the advantages and opportunities that it serves. Hence the conclusion that the power to rescind is but an ingredient in securing normative assurance, which itself serves the point and purpose of the promise, rather than being an independent interest that promises are there to serve.
One final point before moving on: In asserting that promissees' interests are served by having the power to rescind the promise I was implicitly assuming that the case for that power is analogous to the case for the power to make promises. But there are important differences between them. We all have the power to promise. It merely depends on basic mental competence. But the power of promissees is had only by promissees, who are invested with it by promisors. Furthermore, in a significant number of cases, keeping promises disadvantages promissees. This need not be by damaging their independent interests. It may be because as things turn out keeping the promise imposes a considerable burden on the promisor, while doing little for the promissee.
Promissees may prefer not to be in the situation where they impose the burden of keeping the promise on the promisors. But given that they have the exclusive power to release the promisor from the promise they find themselves with the burden of deciding whether to release the promisor and of communicating their decision to him. Most of the time this is hardly a burden at all, but at times it is. Can we still say that having the power to rescind the promise is of value to promissees? I think that we can.
Considerations like the one I mentioned show that it is not an unmixed blessing. But it is of value on balance. Those who deny that do not believe that promises are normatively sound.
Promissory reasons
The explanation of the point of promises, the interests they serve, and the way they do so, when applied to each promise, yields an explanation of the reason to keep that promise and of the strength of that reason. The puzzle we started from resulted from the fact that as regards any promised act, the reason to perform it (the reason that applies to each and all of them) is that it was promised, namely the same reason in every case. However, initially we failed to find factors that determine the strength of the reasons and establish how they differ.
Promises are binding because there is normative power to make them, which is grounded in the interest for enhanced control. The question is how can that interest, seemingly affecting all promises uniformly, provide reasons of different strength regarding different promises, or indeed how does it provide any reason to keep promises, given that breaking the promise does not threaten that power?
There is, however, an inevitable and obvious connection between the value of the power to promise and the reasons to keep a promise: to repeat a triviality -the reasons are a result of the use of the power to promise, a result of the making of the specific promise made. All valid promises change the normative situation because they are the exercise of the same power, but they change it differently because they are different promises. In one regard, promises are analogous to gifts: they give promissees the normative assurance of an action (or omission). Whenever I give a gift I change the normative situation by using the same gift-giving power, yet I change it differently by giving different gifts. My exercise of my power of making the promise changed the situation. Now the promissee has that normative assurance, namely I have a promissory reason to perform the promised act. Of course, gift and promises are fundamentally different in other respects: When giving a gift I give the recipient something I had before.
The gift was mine, now it is his. When making a promise I grant the promissee a right that did not exist before to a duty that did not exist before. There is nothing that was mine and is now his.
Promises may, in themselves or in combination with other factors, provide reasons, or affect the strength of reasons, for or against the promised act. But only those that relate to the point of the promise are promissory reasons, and these are the factors that make it a normative assurance meant to be for the promissee.
So that is how we can have our cake and eat it too. Promissory reasons derive from the value of having the power to promise, through its exercise. The exercise of the power introduces variability. All promises are the normative assurance of an act or omission, but the value of that assurance varies.
It is tempting to equate the strength of the reason to keep a promise with the value to the promissee of the promised act. But we already know that that is a mistake. For example, the promisor may perform the promised act anyway, regardless of whether the promise remains binding or whether it is waived by the promissee. The value of the promise is the value of the normative assurance it provides. In a case where the promised act will take place anyway that may be much less than the value to the promissee of the promised act. Besides, the promise is binding even if the promised act is of no value to the promissee. So, where performance of the promised act because it was promised serves the promissee, its value to him is just one consideration that affects the strength of the promissory reason. The opportunity value that the promise provides, its "invitation" to the promissee to developing interests based on the assurance of the promised act, is an independent consideration that is present in almost all promises, and affects their force. Yet there must be other strength-affecting factors present in all cases in which the promise is binding. This is where the power to terminate the promissory obligation, coupled with the fact that it does not lapse unless waived, are relevant. They exist in all binding promises, and their existence is of benefit to the promissee, enabling him to rescind the promise when it is to his advantage to do so, and disabling the promisor from escaping his promissory obligation without the promissee's consent.
As was explained, the promissee's interest in the power to rescind is secondary, being merely protective of the main ways in which the promise is for him. Only in exceptional cases would that be the only aspect of a specific promise that serves his interest, and thereby keeps the promise binding. There is, however, another doubt as to whether that interest can affect the strength of the reason to keep a promise (and if it cannot then in those exceptional cases just mentioned there would be no reason to keep it, it would not be binding). Does breach of the promise deny the promissee the power to terminate the promissory obligation?
I wish to avoid technicalities, and at this point they are hard to ignore altogether. I will simplify. We have to distinguish between a repudiatory breach and a non-repudiatory breach. 27 Now consider the difference between a one-shot promise and a continuous one: between promising to water your plants tomorrow and promising to water them once a week for the coming year. Failure to water them once in the second case is a partial breach. Partial failure is possible regarding some one-shot promises as well: for example when time is not of the essence watering them a day late is not a complete breach. A complete breach is always repudiatory whereas a partial breach may or may not be, depending on the circumstances, including the intentions of the promisor. A repudiatory breach terminates the promissory obligation. It may give rise to a new duty,
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Which can be anticipatory, that is occurring before the time to keep the promise arrives, and can be by declaration: 'I will not keep this promise'; such declaration deprives the promissee of the assurance that is the point of a promise, and is therefore a breach of the promise. a duty to compensate for the breach. 28 In cases of non-repudiatory partial breach the power to waive or rescind the promissory obligation lapses regarding the partial breach, and in repudiatory breach it lapses with the termination of the promissory duty altogether. Hence, even in the marginal cases where the only promissee interest a promise serves is due to the promissee's power to waive his right and terminate the promissory duty, breach affects that interest, and therefore there is reason to keep the promise.
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The new duty comes with new powers to the promissee. But while they include a power to waive the duty to compensate that power differs, both in scope (the duty to compensate differs in content from the promissory duty) and in conditions of its exercise (communicating the waiver to the promisor is not constitutive of it). Hence its existence does not undermine the point in the text.
